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THE NEW LAW OF CHOICE OF LAW IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Gary L. Milhollin*
Governmental interest analysis is now the law of choice of law in the Dis-
trict of Columbia.' Since 1965, the year of Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa
* Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America. B.S., Purdue Uni-
versity, 1961; J.D., Georgetown University, 1965.
1. Cases using this approach have been decided by various courts in the District of
Columbia. In the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
the interest analysis cases are: Mazza v. Mazza, 475 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973); In
re Parkwood, 461 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v.
Markowitz Bros., Inc., 452 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d
216 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Roscoe v. Roscoe, 379 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Dovell v.
Arundel Supply Corp., 361 F.2d 543 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Williams v. Rawlings Truck
Lines, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Tramontana v. S.A Empresa de Viacao
Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Interest analysis cases in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia are: Cornwell v. C.I.T. Corp.,
373 F. Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1974); Farrier v. May Dep't Stores Co., 357 F. Supp. 190
(D.D.C. 1973); Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Coe, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C.
1972); Emmert v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1969). Only two interest
analysis cases have been decided by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. They
are: Fowler v. A & A Co., 262 A.2d 344 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970); McCrossin v. Hicks
Chevrolet, Inc., 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
In 1971 Congress eliminated the power of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit to review judgments of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, and made the latter the highest court of the District of Columbia. District
of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970, D.C. CODE ANN. §
1-1510 (1973), formerly Act of Oct. 21, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-614, § 11, 82 Stat. 1209.
Since interest analysis had been adopted and elaborated principally by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, see, e.g., Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de
Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, supra, there was some question whether this method would
continue to be followed by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.
In M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971), the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals determined the extent to which it was bound by earlier holdings of
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. After giving
a brief history of the local court, it said:
[W]e are not bound by the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals ren-
dered after [February 1, 1971, the effective date of the court reorganization
Act]. With respect to decisions of the United States Court of Appeals
rendered prior to February 1, 1971, we recognize that they, like the decisions
of this court, constitute the case law of the District of Columbia. As a matter
of internal policy, we have adopted the rule that no division of this court will
. ..refuse to follow a decision of the United States Court of Appeals rendered
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de Viacao A erea Rio Grandense,2 the District of Columbia courts have shown
a steady adherence to the new "policy" approach to conflicts problems. It
is no longer possible to assume, for example, that tort liability is determined
by the place of the injury, that contract rights are determined by the place
of contracting, or that issues can be divided into "substance" and "proce-
dure." Gone forever are the territorialist days of the first Restatement of
the Conflict of Laws.
This article will describe the developments which have occurred in the Dis-
trict thus far and will offer some suggestions for the resolution of future cases.
Before taking the cases up, however, a general word should be said about
the new method of decision. What are the assumptions behind it, and how
have these assumptions been treated in the District's courts?
Simply stated, the objective of governmental interest analysis is (1) to
identify the governmental policies underlying each law in conflict, and (2)
to decide which state's policy would be advanced by having its law applied
to the facts at bar.3  The classic illustration is the case in which an automo-
prior to February 1, 1971, and that such result can only be accomplished by
this court en banc.
Id. at 312 (footnote omitted). This statement and the pre-1971 decisions of the local
court, see, e.g., Fowler v. A & A Co., supra, indicate that the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals will continue to follow the interest analysis approach set forth in this article.
For detailed accounts of the District of Columbia's court reorganization scheme, see
Symposium-The Modernization of Justice in the District of Columbia, 20 Am. U.L.
REV. 237 (1971); Note, An Erie Doctrine for the District of Columbia, 62 GEO. L.J.
963 (1974).
2. 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966), discussed at
pp. 465-71 infra.
3. Professor Brainerd Currie, the leading scholarly proponent of interest analysis,
set forth the general decisional scheme as follows:
1. Normally, even in cases involving foreign elements, the court should be
expected, as a matter of course, to apply the rule of decision found in the law
of the forum.
2. When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the
rule of decision, the court should, first of all, determine the governmental
policy expressed in the law of the forum. It should then inquire whether the
relation of the forum to the case is such as to provide a legitimate basis for
the assertion of an interest in the application of that policy ...
3. If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed by
the foreign law, and whether the foreign state has an interest in the application
of its policy.
4. If the court finds that the forum state has no interest in the application
of its policy, but that the foreign state has, it should apply the foreign law.
5. If the court finds that the forum state has an interest in the application
of its policy, it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign
state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy, and, a
fortiori, it should apply the law of the forum if the foreign state has no such
interest.
1975]
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bile driver and passenger who live in a state without an automobile guest
statute (state A) drive into a state having such a statute (state B) and are
injured there. Two policies would be identified as underlying state B's stat-
ute: that of protecting hosts from "ungrateful" guests, and of protecting
insurance companies -from collusive suits. Since neither the host nor the in-
surance company resides in the state having the guest statute (it being as-
sumed that the company resides where it writes the insurance), that state's
policies could not be advanced by being applied to the hypothetical facts.
The assumption is that the guest statute was enacted with local hosts and local
insurance companies in mind. A contrary policy would be found to underlie
the law of state A; the policy there is one of compensation of those injured
by the negligence of auto hosts. This policy would be advanced by applying
it to the facts because the plaintiff is a resident of state A, and because the
welfare burden falls on the plaintiff's domicile if the plaintiff is impoverished
by his injuries. In the case posited here, in which the policy of only one state
(state A) can be advanced by having its law applied to the facts, the policies
of the states are not really in conflict: a "false conflict" appears and the court
should apply the law of the only interested state.4  The result, of course,
would be contrary to that of the traditional theory, which applied the law
of the place of injury. 5
If the facts in the example are changed so that the driver and the car are
from state B, the state with the guest statute, but the passenger is still from
state A, which imposes liability, then a "true conflict" appears when the pas-
senger is taken from his domicile into the guest statute state and injured there.
This is because state B would now advance the host-protecting and insurer-
protecting policies of its own law by shielding the local host who is locally
Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUKE L.J. 171,
178, in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICTS OF LAWS 183-84 (1963).
4. See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), in which the court held that Ontario had "no conceivable interest in denying
a remedy to a New York guest against his New York host for injuries suffered in On-
tario .... " Id. at 482, 191 N.E.2d at 284, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 750. The Ontario guest
statute, designed to protect insurance companies against fraudulent claims by passengers
acting in collusion with insured drivers, was not intended to govern when both the driver
and the insurance carrier were from New York. New York's policy of compensating
its plaintiff did apply, however, and recovery was allowed. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145, Illustration 1 (1969). Babcock and "false con-
flicts" are discussed in D. CAvans, CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS LAW IN AMERICAN PER-
SPECTIVE: RECUEIL DES CouRs 77-308 (1970); Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion
in New York, 1963 DUKE L.J. 1, in B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS 690 (1963). See generally Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57
CORNELL L. REv. 315 (1972).
5. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934).
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insured. State A, of course, would still have its policy of compensating its
plaintiffs---or at least those injured as a result of trips originating in state
A-because of the "welfare" interest of the plaintiff's domicile. 6 Thus each
state would have an interest in the application of its own law to the facts.
In this situation, interest analysis, or at least the version of it favored by one
leading scholar, calls for the application of forum law.
7
The best way to approach the District version of this system is to begin
with the case of Mazza v. Mazza.8 A Maryland resident died owning District
land held jointly with his sister, who enjoyed the right of survivorship. The
decedent's wife, who inherited the balance of the estate under the will, was
forced to pay federal estate tax on all the decedent's assets, including the
District land. The wife sued the sister in the District for a portion of the
tax equal to the sister's percentage of the decedent's taxable estate. Under
Maryland law this contribution was required; under District law it perhaps
was not.
The court looked to the policies underlying the laws in conflict. It found
that the Maryland law of apportionment was "intended to protect residuary
beneficiaries from the untoward effects of unforeseen taxes."9 Since the bene-
ficiary was from Maryland, it would advance this Maryland policy to apply
Maryland law to the case:
Since the residence of the decedent will commonly be the residence
of the spouse and dependent children, and since such family mem-
bers are usually the principal beneficiaries, Maryland, as the de-
cedent's residence, has a dominant interest in protection of the
principal beneficiary. . . . Unlike pro rata apportionment, which
can at worst reduce by a percentage some assets which the testator
expected would be transferred in their entirety, payment of taxes
from the residuary estate can consume that estate entirely, perhaps
leaving an intended principal beneficiary with nothing at all.',
This Maryland interest was then compared to that of the District. The
court noted that the District rule of nonapportionment had never been
clearly explained in District decisions, that the rule as it developed at com-
mon law was based on the presumed intent of the testator, that the planning
6. See, e.g., Cipolla v. Shaposka, 439 Pa. 563, 267 A.2d 854 (1970). A symposium
on Cipolla appears in 9 DUQUESNE L. REV. 347 (1971).
7. Currie, supra note 3, at 178.
8. 475 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
9. Id. at 389. The court also found that the Maryland policy "may well be premised
on the conclusion that residuary beneficiaries are likely to be intended principal bene-
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and taxation of estates had undergone substantial change, and that it was
doubtful whether the same presumption could still be made as to the testa-
tor's intent. The courts did not, therefore, "discern a strong . . . [District]
policy requiring application of the nonapportionment rule to the facts before
us."'" Maryland law was applied "on balance" because the Maryland inter-
est appeared stronger.' 2
From this brief example one can see how interest analysis works in a local
context. The objective is always to identify first the policies which underlie
the laws in conflict, and ,then determine how those policies are affected by
the facts at bar. To the extent the policies are uncertain, and to the degree
it is unknown to which combinations of facts they apply, interest analysis will
be difficult to use. Because the policies inevitably depend upon the particu-
lar law, the method requires a separate analysis for each type of law in con-
flict. A presentation of local law must therefore treat a series of items one
by one.
I. INTEREST ANALYSIS APPLIED: TORTS
A. Vicarious Liability
The subject of vicarious liability has produced some of the most doctrin-
ally pure applications of the interest analysis method. In Gaither v. Meyers,13
a Maryland resident was injured on a Maryland road by a thief driving a
station wagon stolen from the District of Columbia. The theft occurred in
part because the owner, a District of Columbia resident, had left the keys
11. ld. at 292.
12. This result is flatly contrary to the situs reference of the traditional theory. See
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLIcr OF LAws §§ 214-54 (1934). The court indicated rather
specifically why the older theory was not followed:
Concerns with the stability of use of, and marketability of title to, land were
bases of the traditional conflicts rule that the law of the situs governs ques-
tions of succession to land, and allocation of the federal estate taxes is at least
a related issue.
In respect of such considerations, however, it is possible to distinguish be-
tween questions of succession to land and those concerning apportionment of
estate taxes against the land. The question of apportionment could affect title
to the land only indirectly at best, and would in any event affect only a portion
of the value. Unlike questions relating to the validity of title, the issue of tax
liability is one of short duration. The attenuation of this relationship suggests
that a principle reason for the concern with stability of title-the danger of
third-party reliance on the law of the situs-is insubstantial with regard to the
responsibility for estate taxes. Since it seems that the interests underlying the
traditional rule are not involved in this case, that rule casts no weight into the
balance.
475 F.2d at 391 (footnotes omitted).
13. 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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to -the wagon in its tailgate. The owner's act violated a local motor vehicle
regulation, 14 and the District of Columbia courts had held that a violation
of this regulation was negligence per se. 15 In Maryland, it was also an of-
fense for an owner to leave the keys in an unattended automobile, but the
Maryland courts had ruled that the intervention of the thief broke the chain
of proximate cause between the owner's act and the plaintiff's injury. Thus,
in Maryland the owner was shielded from liability.' 6
To decide the case, the court said it was necessary first to identify the gov-
ernmental interest of the District of Columbia. Under the facts at bar, the
District's policy consisted of the "key" regulation and the local cases constru-
ing it. Those cases had viewed the regulation as a safety measure. The
tort liability aided in "discouraging the hazardous conduct which the ordi-
nance forbids.' 7  Thus, the District regulation contained a policy of deter-
rence as well as compensation of injured parties.' 8 From this it followed that
14. District of Columbia Traffic and Motor Vehicle Regulations art. XIV, § 98
(1971) provides:
No person driving, or in charge of a motor vehicle shall permit it to stand un-
attended without first stopping the engine, locking the ignition, removing the
key, and effectively setting the brake thereon and, when standing upon any
grade, turning the front wheels to the curb or side of the highway.
The court interpreted this language to reach the facts in Gaither-in which the driver
removed the keys from the ignition but not completely from the car-reasoning that a
key left in a tailgate presented at least as great a danger of theft as one left in the igni-
tion. 404 F.2d at 220.
15. See Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
16. See Liberto v. Holfeldt, 221 Md. 62, 155 A.2d 698 (1959).
17. 404 F.2d at 222, quoting Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
In the Ross decision, holding that the violation of the regulations was negligence per se,
the court stated that
[tihe evident purpose of requiring motor vehicles to be locked is not to prevent
theft for the sake of owners or the police, but to promote the safety of the
public in the streets. An unlocked motor vehicle . . . creates much more risk
that meddling by children, thieves, or others will result in injuries to the public
... . The rule we are adopting tends to make the streets safer by discour-
aging the hazardous conduct which the ordinance forbids. It puts the burden of
the risk, as far as may be, upon those who create it.
139 F.2d at 15-16. The Gaither court also cited a government survey showing the acci-
dent rate for stolen cars to be 200 times the normal rate, and another disclosure that
keys had been left in the car or in the ignition in 42.3 percent of all stolen cars. 404
F.2d at 222-23.
18. The court admitted that a "compensatory policy has the greatest relevance to
cases when the mishap occurs in the District and when District residents are plaintiffs."
404 F.2d at 223. It added, however, the following statement favoring compensation:
[Tio confine the benefits of the Ross rule to the territory ceded by the states
of Maryland and Virginia to form the Nation's Capital would be to shun the
present reality of the economically and socially integrated greater metropolitan
area. It is a commonplace that residents of Maryland are part of the Washing-
ton metropolitan trading area, and that District residents and businesses have
19751
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when the driver's conduct occurred in the District, the District's deterrence
policy would be advanced by applying District law to the case, even though
no District citizen or property had actually been harmed. The defendant's
act created the precise danger to District life and property which the regula-
tion sought to prevent. Liability would discourage such an act.
It was also necessary to ascertain the interest of Maryland. That interest
was expressed by the ruling on proximate cause by Maryland's highest court:
car owners were not liable for injuries caused by thieves. Could this defend-
ant-protecting policy be advanced -by applying Maryland law to the facts?
The court thought not:
[The] interest of Maryland in curtailing liability of a car owner,
would not seem to extend to an owner like our defendant, who is
not a citizen of Maryland but rather a resident of the District of
Columbia ...
Thus, we are not concerned with any real "conflict" between the
interests of Maryland and the District in this case. The fact that
two states have different rules where all the factors are oriented to
one state does not necessarily mean that there is a "conflict" in
which one state demands and the other rejects the application of its
rule to a situation where the pertinent factors arise in two or more
states. Where there is no such conflict of interest in a multi-state
situation, as this court and others have noted, there is a "false con-
flicts" situation.' 9
Gaither thus demonstrates as firm a commitment to interest analysis for
torts as Mazza demonstrates for estate taxation. The relevance for choice
of law for any particular fact is determined only after an identification of
the policies at issue. The place of injury, for example, is found to be of little
relevance for a policy of deterrence. Instead, the crucial fact becomes the
place of the defendant's act. The residence of the defendant, in like man-
ner, has little importance unless the policy of some state is activated by it.
Here, that was not the case. The assumption always made is -that a particular
fact has no inherent significance in itself; it only serves as a basis for deciding
whether a policy is applicable. The Gaither court held that Maryland's de-
fendant-protecting policy was directed principally to Maryland defendants,
and the court assumed that Maryland law did not wish to deny relief to its
an interest in the well-being of these citizens of the Free State. We cannot
fairly impute to Congress, or its delegate, the parochial intention to restrict re-
covery based on violation of the District regulation to District residents, es-
pecially taking into account the national constituency of Congress, in the ab-
sence of an express disclaimer.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
19. Id. at 224 (footnote omitted).
,[Vol. 24:448
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own plaintiffs unless a protected Maryland resident were being sued. Find-
ing no Maryland policy against recovery and thus a false conflict, the court
applied the forum's deterrent policy to the forum conduct.
The Gaither case states the basic elements of the false conflicts method
for torts. To elaborate the method further, however, one might hypotheti-
cally alter the facts in Gaither. If the same District owner left the same keys
in the same car but on a nearby street in Maryland, and if the same thief
injured the same Marylander in the District of Columbia, what would the
District of Columbia court hold? The hypothetical moves the conduct out-
side the forum and the injury within it. Does it follow then that the forum's
deterrent policy no longer applies? To decide such a question the court
would have to define the territorial reach of that policy. Is there still a dan-
ger to District residents and property when suburban drivers leave the keys
in unattended cars? The hypothetical facts indicate that such a danger ex-
ists, since the car did in fact enter the District and injure someone. Of
course, a car stolen in Maryland may never in fact enter the District-a possi-
bility which is not present when the District is the site of the theft. However,
District residents frequently travel to the Maryland suburbs, and thus a given
auto stolen in the Maryland suburbs will inevitably pass through an area where
many District residents are present. The same is true of autos stolen in the
Virginia suburbs. It is possible, therefore, to argue that the District's deter-
rent policy should apply throughout the metropolitan area. In the case in
which the owner is a District resident and the injury occurs in the District, we
still have a false conflict if the court assumes that Maryland law intends to
shield only Maryland owners.
Suppose that this same District of Columbia car, causing the same injuries
in the District to the same Marylander, had been stolen in Baltimore instead
of the District's suburbs. The risk then to District interests is considerably
less. The deterrence policy could not be expected to work so far away unless
the court believed that District motorists should behave carefully everywhere
simply because they live in the District. How likely is it that an auto stolen in
Baltimore, Wilmington, or New York City will enter the District of Co-
lumbia? Is it likely enough to defeat the owner's purported reliance on the
defendant-protecting rule in effect where he acted?
20
This is a more difficult case. If the court grants recovery it does so be-
cause the conduct did in fact create a risk to District interests-albeit not a
very foreseeable one-and possibly because the court still finds a false con-
flict. To find a false conflict Maryland's policy would still have to be
20. Of course, no conflict would arise if the state where the owner acted would im-
pose liability.
1975]
Catholic University Law Review
construed as shielding only Maryland defendants. 2 1  On 'the other hand, if
the court denies recovery it is being less generous to Maryland residents than
to its own (a District plaintiff injured in the District under these facts would
probably recover), and it is giving the plaintiff fewer rights than he might
have had under the old "place of injury" rule.
22
There is language in Gaither which suggests that the court would not dis-
criminate among residents of the metropolitan area; 23 if a recovery is
granted to a District resident, it would also be granted to a Maryland resi-
dent. Since a District resident injured in the District would probably benefit
from the compensatory aspect of the regulation, the court's language makes
it difficult to turn the Maryland resident away.24 However it is doubtful
that the language can be taken seriously. If the court has a policy of com-
pensating suburbanites because they are part of -the District's economy, the
court must then be prepared to discriminate among Marylanders by denying
to plaintiffs from Annapolis the protection afforded those from the Washing-
ton suburbs. Can a court really discriminate according to whether the plain-
tiff lives on one side or the other of a foreign state? In this situation the
policy approach shows strain. To avoid discrimination in the case posed-
21. Maryland would apply its own law if the injury occurred in Maryland. See
White v. King, 244 Md. 348, 223 A.2d 763 (1966) (Michigan guest statute applies to
Maryland residents injured in Michigan). However, when the conduct occurs in Mary-
land but the injury takes place in the District, Maryland case law indicates that Mary-
land would apply District law. See Uppgren v. Executive Aviation Servs., Inc., 326 F.
Supp. 709 (D. Md. 1971) (Minnesota law applied to crash of helicopter in Minnesota
despite allegation that negligence occurred in Maryland); Debbis v. Hertz Corp., 269
F. Supp. 671 (D. Md. 1967) (West Virginia law applied to injuries received by Mary-
lander in West Virginia despite alleged negligence of Virginia defendant in making car
rental agreement in Virginia); Herr v. Holohan, 131 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1955)
(Pennsylvania owner liability law applied to plaintiff injured in Pennsylvania by son of
Maryland defendant driving vehicle with defendant's permission). See also McCall v.
Susquehanna Elec. Co., 278 F. Supp. 209 (D. Md. 1968) (when alleged negligence of
defendant in opening gates of a Maryland dam caused decedent's boat to capsize in Sus-
quehanna River, admiralty jurisdiction was proper because river was where alleged negli-
gence "became operative" on decedent). If the injury in the District resulted in death,
a Maryland statute, MD. Crs. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-903(a) (1974), commands
that District law be applied. See Wilson v. Frazer, 353 F. Supp. 1 (D. Md. 1973).
22. The first Restatement is ambiguous on this point. __Compare RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934), with id. § 380(2).
23. See note 18 supra.
24. Charges of discrimination, however, have not deterred the New York Court of
Appeals. In Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972), an Ontario passenger was killed in Ontario by the alleged negligence of the New
York driver of the New York automobile in which the decedent was riding. Although
the court denied recovery by applying the Ontario guest statute, it admitted it would have
ignored the statute if the passenger had been from New York, as it did in Tooker v.
Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
[Vol. 24:448
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whether in favor of one Maryland resident over another or in favor of Dis-
trict residents over Maryland residents-the Court would have to confess to
favoring a compensatory policy for all plaintiffs injured in the District. This,
however, would be a territorialist view inconsistent with Maryland's supposed
indifference to defendants acting in Maryland. That is, if the District's key
regulation expresses an interest in compensating a Maryland plaintiff injured
in the District, then Maryland's holding of no proximate cause expresses an
interest in protecting a District defendant acting in Maryland. One cannot
have a false conflict by assuming that Maryland's interest depends upon
domicile rather than presence within the jurisdiction, and yet at the same time
suppose that the District has a "true" interest dependent upon presence
within the jurisdiction rather than domicile. The only way to handle this as
a false conflict, and yet hold for the plaintiff, is to assume that (1) the com-
pensatory aspect of the District's regulation does not apply to any Maryland
plaintiff; (2) Maryland's denial of proximate cause is not meant to shield
District of Columbia defendants; and (3) the District's deterrence policy is
advanced because the prohibited conduct produced its effects within the Dis-
trict. If these assumptions are made, then there is a false conflict and Dis-
trict law applies. If the assumptions seem questionable, it is principally be-
cause interest analysis itself is questionable in some of its applications. If this
case in fact occurs, the court probably would hold for the plaintiff rather than
discriminate. The court's language, however, may be expected to stress de-
terrence in order to keep the logic whole.
25
25. A New York court did just that in this situation. After Babcock v. Jackson, 12
N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963), see note 4 supra, was decided,
the factual converse of that case arose in Kell v. Henderson, 26 App. Div. 2d 595, 270
N.Y.S.2d 552 (Civ. Ct. 1966). In Kell, an Ontario passenger was injured in New York
by the Ontario driver of an Ontario automobile on a weekend motor trip. The court
refused to apply the Ontario guest statute, notwithstanding the Babcock holding that
Ontario had no interest in protecting a foreign host and his insurer. Since New York
by this same reasoning would have no interest in compensating an Ontario plaintiff, the
only basis for the plaintiff's recovery could be a New York policy of deterring negligent
driving, or possibly a New York interest in providing a fund for New York medical cred-
itors. Accord, Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973) (court ig-
nored Ontario guest statute on facts almost identical to those in Kell). Moreover, the
California Supreme Court's decision in Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522
P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1974), that the estate of a Mexican national killed in Cali-
fornia could recover an amount in excess of the maximum allowed by Mexican law,
stated squarely that deterrence was its motive for refusing to limit wrongful death dam-
ages. The deterrence rationale was required by the court's previous holding in Reich
v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967), that under a compen-
sation theory the court would apply the higher damage rule of Ohio, the decedent's domi-
cile, to a death caused in Missouri by a California defendant.
One might also ask how the hypothetical case would be decided if the court used the
approach of the Restatement (Second). Section 146, which covers personal injuries, would
1975]
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What, then, are the limits of this deterrence policy? As we have just dis-
covered, it may well protect a Marylander injured in the District against a
District of Columbia automobile owner acting outside of the suburbs. We
know that Gaither protected a Marylander injured in the suburbs against a
District of Columbia owner acting within the District. Would it have mat-
tered in Gaither if the injured Marylander had resided farther away? Sup-
pose the injury occurred on Maryland's Eastern Shore, or in New York City.
If the regulation's object is to deter this conduct within the District, then per-
haps the place of injury is irrelevant so long as the conduct is local. The
question would come down to a weighing of local interests. Is it wise to make
District of Columbia defendants liable for injuries occurring anywhere in or-
der to reduce the risk of local harm which their conduct poses? According
refer to the place of injury unless some other state had a "more significant relationship
. . . to the occurrence and the parties." This latter state would be selected by consider-
ing the "contacts" listed in section 145: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b)
the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile of the parties,
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. These
contacts, in turn, are only to be taken into account when applying the "principles" listed
in section 6:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those
states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
In the hypothetical case, this might be sorted out as follows: contact (a) of section
145 is in the District, contact (b) is in Maryland, contact (c) is divided, and contact
(d) is irrelevant because no "relationship" exists. These contacts have significance,
however, only in view of the principles of section 6. Principle (a) is inconclusive; prin-
ciple (b) points to the District because the policy of the District (deterrence) is ad-
vanced by applying District law; principle (c) does not point to Maryland because Mary-
land has no interest in shielding District owners from liability for District harm; prin-
ciple (d) is of little weight because "[t]here are occasions, particularly in the area of
negligence, when the parties act without giving thought to the legal consequences of their
conduct. . . . In such situations, the parties have no justified expectations to pro-
tect...." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, comment g (1969);
principle (e) speaks to validation policies associated with consensual transactions, id.,
comment h; principle (f) applies to problems such as title to land and moveables where
certainty is paramount; principle (g) is a "goal for which to strive" but "should not be
overemphasized," id., comment j.
One concludes that principle (b) is the only one which clearly applies and thus sec-
tions 6 and 146 point to District law. This is supported by the words of comment j:
"In general, it is fitting that the state whose interests are the most deeply affected should
have its local law applied." One now sees that it was really contact (a) of section 145
which was the most important after all.
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to a recent holding by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, the balance tips toward liability. 26
A similar analysis would apply to the case in which the injury and conduct
occur outside the forum, but the conduct is still within the area of likely harm
to forum interests. This would occur when, for example, a suburban resident
is injured in the suburbs by a car stolen in the suburbs from a District owner.
Again, the District's deterrence policy would have to be matched against the
burden on District owners. The court may find the danger to District inter-
ests less in this case than in Gaither, but, as mentioned above, the court could
hardly find the danger negligible. The prediction again is that District law
would be applied. If the court adheres to interest analysis, the interest of
other states would be found irrelevant; one still assumes the suburban juris-
diction has no interest in shielding District owners from liability.27
When the District owner acts outside the suburbs-but the injury is within
the District suburbs to a suburban resident-one might expect the balance
26. Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (New
York's stricter owner liability law applies to New York owner whose car caused injury
in the District), see pp. 464-65 infra. See also Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340 (D.
Conn. 1961) (Connecticut "dram shop" act applies to Connecticut barkeeper who sold
liquor to driver causing injury in New York); Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, 249 Minn. 376,
82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (Minnesota "dram shop' act applied to Minnesota barkeeper
who sold liquor to driver whose passengers were injured in Wisconsin). But cf. Eldridge
V. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 512 (1950) (Illinois act did
not apply to nonresident injured outside the state).
Under the Restatement (Second)'s approach, see note 25 supra, the reference would
probably be to District law. The section 145 contacts are again divided, and principle
(c) would still not point to Maryland for the reasons stated above. See note 25 supra.
Principle (b) would still point to the District, and the application of the other princivles
would remain the same.
When the theft in the District occurs on private property, the "key" regulation, see
note 14 supra, does not apply and the case is decided according to negligence principles.
See Casey v. Corson & Gruman Co., 221 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (leaving keys in
unattended truck was not proximate cause of plaintiff's injury fifteen miles south of
Petersburg, Virginia, since act was too remote in time, place, and circumstance from col-
lision).
27. This is a difficult case under the Restatement (Second). See note 25 supra. It
would seem that an analysis of the principles of section 6 would still yield a false con-
flict, with principle (b) pointing to the District and principle (c) not pointing to Mary-
land. However, comment (b) to section 145 declares that "subject only to rare excep-
tions, the local law of the state where conduct and injury occurred will be applied to
determine whether the actor satisfied minimum standards of applicable conduct ....
Comment (e) to section 146 states that "[o]n rare occasions when conduct and injury
occur in different states, a state which is neither the state of conduct nor of injury may
nevertheless be that of the most significant relationship .... ". The example is a case
in which a forum resident buys a ticket from a local airline for a flight which takes off
and lands in the forum but crosses en route a portion of another state. Though the
negligence and injury occur in the other state, forum law applies.
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to tip in the owner's favor though some local risk does occur. When
both the injury and the conduct occur beyond the suburbs, the District's de-
terrence policy surely becomes de minimus and the court should not hold the
District owner liable.
The only remaining problem of deterrence is the one posed by the motor-
ist who is not a District resident. Would any of the above analyses change
if the motorist were a Marylander? When the car is stolen in the District,
one would not expect a District court to exempt foreign defendants from the
burdens it imposes upon its own defendants for local conduct. When the
theft is in the suburbs, however, the risk to District interests remains, though
the transaction is wholly foreign. Should the District allow recovery by a
Marylander injured in Maryland after a theft in Maryland from a Maryland
motorist when the Maryland courts would not?2s  The Maryland interest in
protecting its own motorist acting at home would probably outweigh the Dis-
trict's interest in suburban deterrence.
29
This is surely enough discussion of deterrence. One can see that for in-
terest analysis to work, there must be agreement on which facts bring a given
policy into play. The assumption here was that the factual proximity to local
lives and property should be the test for the District's policy of deterrence.
Since there was also a Maryland policy at issue, it was likewise necessary
to decide which facts were relevant for it. A false conflict was found by
assuming that Maryland's policy of denying liability was not intended to ben-
efit a District motorist acting within the District. When the conduct shifted
to Maryland, this assumption was more difficult, but was nevertheless made.
Similar problems arise when the relevant policy is compensation. If in
Gaither a District resident-instead of a Maryland resident-had been in-
jured in Maryland after the theft in the District, the question would have
been whether the key regulation also expressed a policy of compensation.
The Gaither court held that the regulation did intend to compensate injured
plaintiffs.A0 The task, then, becomes one of identifying the plaintiffs to
whom the policy applies. Does the fact of District residence bring a plantiff
within the protected class? Since the District bears the welfare costs when
28. See note 21 supra.
29. The Restatement (Second), see note 25 supra, is unaffected by the residence of the
owner insofar as sections 145 and 146 are concerned, because those sections are princi-
pally geared to places. At least that is true when no prior relationship exists between
the parties. However, section 6 would change because principle (c) would now point
strongly to Maryland. This would be balanced against principle (b) which still points
(but more weakly) to the District.
30. "[T]ort liability also has the purpose of shifting the loss from the injured victim




its residents are disabled, the answer seems to be that it does. Or at least it
seems so when, as in Gaither, the defendant is also a District resident who has
acted in the District. By applying District law, the court fulfills the regula-
tion's dual policies of compensation and deterrence.
The compensation policy may be less clear on different facts, however. Let
us suppose a District plaintiff has been injured in the District by a Maryland
owner's auto stolen in Maryland. The owner-protecting policy in Mary-
land clearly applies to Marylanders acting at home, or at least that would
be the case if Maryland used interest analysis. 3' Thus we have a true con-
flict: each state's policy would be advanced by the application of its law.
It would be necessary now to balance the District policy of compensat-
ing District residents against the Maryland policy of shielding Maryland
owners. How would this be done? Professor Currie would have the forum
apply its own law unless there were some persuasive reason for sacrificing for-
um policy. 32 A well-known California decision indicates that the ex-
pectation of the Maryland owner might be relevant, since he did act at home
and could expect his own law to apply. 3s  However, when the theft occurs
within the District suburbs, the owner could neither deny the danger to Dis-
trict interests nor view that danger as unforeseeable. By allowing recovery
for the District plaintiff, the court would advance the local "welfare" interest
in compensation and also whatever local deterrence interest might exist in
suburban conduct. Other states under similar facts have applied local law
on behalf of the local resident.
3 4
31. According to Herr v. Holohan, 131 F. Supp. 777 (D. Md. 1955), Maryland might
also apply District law in these circumstances. See note 21 supra.
32. Currie, supra note 3, at 178.
33. People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 48 Cal. 2d 595, 311 P.2d 480 (1957).
California sought to forfeit an automobile for unlawful transportation of marijuana
within its jurisdiction pursuant to a state statute that forfeited the interest of the chat-
tel mortgage unless it were shown that the mortgagee made a reasonable investigation of
the mortgagor's character. Texas, where the sale took place and the mortgage was filed,
had no similar requirement. The court said that the mortgagee "cannot reasonably
be expected to familiarize himself with and comply in Texas with the statutes of the
48 or more jurisdictions into which the automobile could possibly be taken without his
consent." Id. at 599, 311 P.2d at 482. But cf. Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Ore.
1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964) (forum fails to protect Californian acting at home by applying
its "spendthrift" law to contract made and to be performed in California between Cali-
fornia plaintiff and Oregon spendthrift).
34. See, e.g., Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933) (New Jersey decision upheld in
applying New York's vicarious liability law to New York plaintiff injured in New York
by person to whom New Jersey defendant had lent his car in New Jersey); Venuto
v. Robinson, 118 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1941) (New Jersey law determines whether
truck driver-truck owner relationship was master-servant or independent-contractor when
truck leased in North Carolina caused death in New Jersey). But see Scheer v. Rockne
Motors Corp., 68 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1934) (New York owner not liable for bailee's neg-
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If the Maryland owner's conduct occurs beyond the suburbs, the deterrence
interest disappears and the compensation interest stands alone. Against this
interest is the Maryland refusal to impose liability and the Maryland owner's
expectation of being protected by his own law for acts committed at home.
Would District law nevertheless apply? Under interest analysis it may well
apply unless some "multistate" policy resolves the true conflict in the owner's
favor.35 The Maryland owner can assert his expectations; so, too, can the Dis-
trict plaintiff, since he was injured at home and could not expect his own
law to protect him less from strangers than from his fellow District residents.
However the expectations may be weighed, and it is perhaps fanciful even
to speak of expectations in auto tort cases, there remains the clear local in-
terest in compensation. In this day of insurance the court might find it hard
to deny the benefit of local law for local injuries to local plaintiffs.3 6
If both the conduct and the injury to the District resident occur outside
the District, the compensation policy must be stretched beyond its previous
applications. The conduct and injury could still fall within the suburbs, of
course, and the deterrence argument would still exist. The plaintiff's District
residence, however, now adds the compensation argument to the deterrence
argument. So in the suburban theft from the Maryland motorist, we have
the "welfare" interest of the District in its plaintiff, plus the diluted ,but still
visible deterrence interest of the District in suburban conduct pitted against
the declared policy of Maryland that its drivers are not liable for this type
of Maryland conduct. In which direction does the balance tip? Should the
liability of the Maryland owner acting in Maryland be made to depend upon
whether the Maryland thief injures someone from the District? Or should the
protection of District citizens 'by the District's courts be made to depend upon
whether the thief hits these citizens on the District or Maryland side of an
urban street? No answer to this question will please everyone. If a predic-
tion is necessary, it would be that the court, finding itself at trail's end in
ligence in Ontario unless owner authorized trip).
Under the Restatement (Second), see note 25 supra, the reference would also be to the
District. The section 145 contacts are divided-the injury is in the District, the conduct
in Maryland, the domicile is divided, and no prior relationship exists. The principles
of section 6 are divided also, with (b) pointing to the District and (c) pointing to Mary-
land. Comment (e) to section 146, however, states that in cases where conduct and
injury occur in different states, "persons who cause injury in a state should not ordinar-
ily escape liability imposed by the local law of that state...." In addition, illustration
I to section 157 indicates that when the state of injury imposes a higher standard of
care than that of the state of the conduct, the law of the state of injury applies.
35. See, e.g., D. CAvERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAw PROCESS (1965); Baxter, Choice of
Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1963).
36. The Restatement (Second), see note 25 supra, would probably follow the analysis
indicated above, see note 21 supra, and apply District law.
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a new land, might well return to the old "territorial residue;" it might apply
Maryland law simply to avoid discriminating on the basis of residency in
cases in which the entire transaction is foreign.3 7 This prediction would apply
a fortiori to the case in which a District resident is injured beyond the suburbs
by a car stolen from a Maryland owner acting beyond the suburbs.38
Thus far, the illustrations of the District's compensatory interest have pre-
sumed a Maryland driver. How does the analysis change when the driver
is from the District? In the first case, when the theft is in the suburbs and
the injury is in the District to a District resident, the District driver could
not escape under any version of interest analysis. Consequently, a false con-
flict exists, and both the deterrence and compensatory interests of the District
are advanced by applying District law. For conduct beyond the suburbs, a
false conflict still exists-though mainly with the District's compensatory in-
interest-since one still assumes there is no Maryland interest in protecting
District drivers. If the District resident is injured beyond the suburbs by a theft
beyond the suburbs from a District driver, there will still be a false conflict if
the court follows the celebrated New York precedent of Tooker v. Lopez,39
in which a New York court applied New York law to the claim of a New
York passenger against a New York driver for injuries received in Michigan.
Tooker has been criticized on the ground that it contemplates turning away a
Michigan plaintiff injured in the same circumstances. 40 If the District adopted
Tooker, it would no doubt be forced to discriminate in the same way, unless
the District were prepared to allow a recovery under District law to anyone
injured anywhere by a theft anywhere from a District driver who violated
the key regulation. As indicated above in the discussion on deterrence, such
a burden on District drivers is hardly justified by the local risk. The pre-
diction, then, is that the District would follow Tooker and accept the discrim-
inatory consequences. The District should not be discouraged from protect-
37. The Second Circuit has predicted that New York would engage in this type of
discrimination. See Rosenthal v. Warren, 475 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1973). But see Pryor
v. Swarner, 445 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir. 1971); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286
N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64 (1972).
The Restatement (Second), see note 25 supra, would probably apply Maryland law on
these facts. The place of injury and place of conduct (contacts (a) and (b) of section
145) lie in Maryland, and the domicile (contract (c)) is divided. Principle (b) still
points to the District but principle (c) points to Maryland. And comment b to sec-
tion 145 states that where the injury and conduct occur in the same state, that state's
law applies "subject only to rare exceptions."
38. But see Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aera Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d
468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966); pp. 465-71 infra.
39. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969); see note 24 supra.
40. See Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 286 N.E.2d 454, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64
(1972).
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ing District citizens against District defendants under District law simply be-
cause other courts will not do the same for their citizens. 41
Before leaving the subject of vicarious liability, it would be useful to add
a few remarks about the District of Columbia Financial Responsibility Law,
which is limited to vehicles "operated upon the public highways of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. ' 42 Because of this language, no recovery can be had un-
der this act for injuries received elsewhere.48  There is, however, a common
law rule in the District creating a rebuttable presumption that an auto
involved in an accident was operated either by the owner or with his con-
sent.44 This common law rule, unlike the statute, is not by its terms lim-
ited to District accidents; at least arguments to this effect can be based upon
the holding in Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc.45
In Williams, a New Yorker sold his auto in New York to one Rivera, who
then drove the car to the District and injured his New Jersey passenger, Wil-
liams, in a District collision. Rivera disappeared and Williams sued the New
York owner in the District under New York's owner liability statute. The
New York decisions had construed the statute as estopping the owner from
disproving ownership when his license plates were left on the car, 40 the case
in Williams. The District decisions, however, had allowed the registered
owner to avoid liability by proving the passage of equitable title.47 The Dis-
41. The Restatement (Second)'s approach, see note 25 supra, is somewhat confusing
when applied to these facts. The contacts of place of injury and place of conduct under
section 145 are in Maryland but the domicile of the parties (contact (c)) is in the Dis-
trict. Principle (b) of section 6 refers to the District and principle (c) does not refer
to Maryland. We have the statement in comment b to section 145 that when the
injury and conduct are in the same state that state's law applies almost without excep-
tion, and yet comment d to section 145 states that "the local law of the state where
the parties are domiciled, rather than the local law of the state of conduct and injury,
may be applied to determine whether ...one party owes the other a higher standard
of care than would be required .. .by the local law of the state where conduct and
injury occurred." In this case as in the others, it seems that interest analysis is a
sharper tool than the Restatement (Second).
42. D.C. CODE ANN. § 40-424 (1973).
43. See Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 219 (D.C. Cir. 1968). But cf. Farber v.
Smolack, 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967), in which New York
applied its owner liability statute to a foreign accident despite language limiting it to
a "vehicle used or operated in this state." N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAw § 388 (Mc-
Kinney 1970).
44. See, e.g., Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 2.19 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
45. 357 F.2d 581 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
46. See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Guthiel, 2 N.Y.2d 584, 141 N.E.2d 909, 161 N.Y.S.
2d 874 (1957); Switzer v. Aldrich, 307 N.Y. 56, 120 N.E.2d 159 (1954); Reese v. Rea-
more, 292 N.Y. 292, 55 N.E.2d 35 (1944); Shuba v. Greendonner, 271 N.Y. 189, 2
N.E.2d 536 (1936).
47. See Mason v. Automobile Fin. Co., 121 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Burt v. Cor-
dover, 117 A.2d 116 (D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1955); Gasque v. Saidman, 44 A.2d 537
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trict of Columbia Circuit, finding a false conflict, applied New York law.
The District's defendant-protecting policy, the court noted, was not applicable
because the defendant and the transaction were both foreign. 48  New York
policy, on the other hand, was "designed to enforce by its in terrorem effect
the vehicle registration laws of the state [and] . . . fulfillment of this basic
goal would require extra-territorial application. .... -49
In Williams, therefore, the District's courts were willing to enforce a New
York deterrence policy by applying it to a New York automobile owner
whose car injured someone outside New York. It would follow that the Dis-
trict should also be willing to enforce a District deterrence policy when a Dis-
trict owner's car injures someone outside the District. Does the District's
common law presumption express a deterrence policy? Language in Wil-
liams and Gaither indicates that it does. Williams held that the purpose of
the Financial Responsibility Law "was to control the giving of consent to irre-
sponsible drivers by the one having that power"5 and thus to "protect
the persons and property of District residents by encouraging safe driving
.... "51 Gaither held that the Financial Responsibility Law "alters the
common law rule only by converting the rebuttable presumption of an agency
into a conclusive one where a single ingredient of actual agency, consent, is
present."' 52 If the deterrence policy is strong and clear where the presump-
tion is conclusive, is it likely that the policy did not exist at all when the
presumption was only rebuttable? Policies such as this are rarely born fully
clothed through interstitial legislation. The District's common law presump-
tion contains a deterrence policy which, under the view of the New York pol-
icy taken in Williams, has extraterritorial effect, and it should therefore apply
in favor of nonresidents injured outside the District by the autos of District
owners.
B. Wrongful Death
The District's leading wrongful death case is Tramontana v. S.A. Em-
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1945); cf. Rosenberg v. Murray, 116 F.2d 552, 553 (D.C. Cir.
1940).
48. 357 F.2d at 585. The analysis in Williams might well be different if the facts
were reversed, i.e., if a District transferor were sued for an accident in New York. In
that situation a true conflict would exist between the plaintiff-protecting law of New
York and the defendant-protecting law of the District. Presumably, the District would
apply its own defendant-protecting law. See p. 463 supra. Needless to say, no reason-




52. 404 F.2d at 219 n.9.
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presa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense,58 which arose from a mid-air col-
lision over Rio de Janeiro, Brazil between a United States Navy aircraft and
a Brazilian airliner. The decedent, a Hyattsville, Maryland resident who was
riding in the Navy plane, was a member of the United States Navy Band
on a tour of South America. The airliner was on a regularly scheduled com-
mercial flight from Campos, Brazil to Rio. The surviving spouse based her
claim on Brazilian law, but argued that the $170 limitation on recovery al-
lowed by that law should be ignored and that the forum's law permitting un-
limited recovery should be substituted.
In its first application of interest analysis, the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the Brazilian damage limit applied. The court accepted the plain-
tiff's argument that the reasoning of Babcock v. .ackson54 and Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc.,56 should replace the territorial view of its older prec-
edents. But in identifying the interests it found that Brazil's policy would
clearly be advanced by applying Brazilian law:
Not only is Brazil the scene of the fatal collision, but Varig is a
Brazilian corporation which, as a national airline, is an object of
concern in terms of national policy. To Brazil, the success of this
enterprise is a matter not only of pride and commercial well-being,
but perhaps even of national security. The limitation on recovery
against airlines operating -in Brazil was enacted in the early days of
commercial aviation, no doubt with a view toward protecting what
was then, and still is, an infant industry of extraordinary public and
national importance. . . . The focus of Brazilian concern could
hardly be clearer."6
The District of Columbia, on the other hand, had no interest at all since
"neither appellant, her children, nor her husband were or are resident or dom-
iciled in the District of Columbia."57  However this lack of forum interest
was not sufficient to resolve the case. Maryland, the decedent's domicile, was
also considered. The court found that as the state of the plaintiff's residence,
its interest in her recovery was "not insignificant," for Maryland would be
forced to support her if she were otherwise unable to support herself.58
There thus existed a true conflict in that the interest of more than one
53. 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 943 (1966).
54. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
55. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961). In Kilberg, New York
refused to apply the Massachusetts damage limit for wrongful death to the case of a New
Yorker killed in Massachusetts by the crash of a flight from New York City to Nan-
tucket.
56. 350 F.2d at 471.
57. Id. at 472.
58. Id. at 473.
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state could be advanced by applying its law to the case. The court concluded
that under the facts Brazil's interest outweighed that of the District, and that
Maryland's law should not be applied by the District when Maryland's choice
of law rule would have applied Brazilian law if the case had been filed in
Maryland. The obvious question is whether the District would have applied
Brazilian law if Maryland's choice of law rule had been different. Other pas-
sengers on the same Navy plane, alleging that the courts of their domiciles
would have ignored the Brazilian limit, later asked the District of Columbia
Circuit to do so. The court refused, saying the interests of Brazil still out-
weighed those of the parties' domiciles.59
Several observations can be gleaned from these opinions. First, the District
will actively "weigh the interests" in a true conflict case. Second, the District
will assign a "welfare" interest to the plaintiff's domicile. Third, the District
may look to the choice of law rule of a foreign state in order to ascertain
the interest of that state in the application of that state's law to the facts at
bar. 60 Finally, a plaintiff may not be allowed to carry the higher protection
of his domicile's law with him when he is injured in a low protection zone
by a resident of that zone. 6'
The latter point could be important in some of the key regulation cases
discussed above. Tramontana would be authority for denying recovery to
a District citizen injured in Maryland by a Maryland car stolen beyond the
suburbs. The Maryland driver acting at home would be protected by his
own law against the higher liability of the plaintiff's domicile, just as the Bra-
zilian airline was in Tramontana. If, however, the car in such a case were
stolen in the District, Tramontana would not apply, and the District's interest
in deterring the owner's conduct would become paramount. This latter case
59. Armiger v. Real S.A. Transportes Aereos, 377 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
60. This reference in Tramontana to Maryland's choice of law rules does not seem
to have committed the District to renvoi. The cases following Tramontana have not
considered the choice of law rules of other states. For a discussion of the extent to
which a court using interest analysis should consult the choice of law rules of another
state, see von Mehren, The Renvoi and its Relation to Various Approaches to the
Choice of Law Problem, in XXmT CENTURY COMPARATVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 380,
394 (1961); R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 53-58 (H.
Nadelmann, A. von Mehren, J. Hazard, eds. 1971).
61. This is consistent with dictum of the New York Court of Appeals in a well
known guest statute case:
When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable
by reason of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort
law of the state of the victim's domicile.
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64,
70 (1972). See also D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 146 (1965).
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would be analogous to one in which a District resident is injured abroad on
a flight to or from a local airport. If the airline sells tickets to District resi-
dents for flights to and from an airport serving the District area, the airline
has clearly removed itself from the purely foreign status Varig enjoyed on
its domestic flight in Tramontana. It has now engaged in a pattern of con-
duct which, if negligent, poses a recurring threat to District citizens. If a
District citizen should in fact be injured, the result is likely to be the same
as in Kilberg: District law would be applied if it granted a higher degree
of protection to the plaintiff than the law at the place of injury. Similarly,
the Marylander who leaves the keys in an unattended auto in the District or
its suburbs also poses a recurrent danger to District residents; if a District
citizen is injured because of this conduct the District should apply its own
more protective law.
This analysis would seem valid for personal injury cases. In wrongful
death actions, however, the problem is complicated by the wording of the
District's wrongful death act, which refers to an "injury done or happening
within the limits of the District .... ,,62 Whether this language would pre-
vent the District from applying its own higher measure of damages if, for
example, a District resident were killed abroad on a flight originating at a
local airport, is a difficult question. In a similar situation in Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines, Inc.,63 the New York Court of Appeals refused to apply
the lower damage limit of Massachusetts to an action by the spouse of a New
Yorker killed in Massachusetts while on a flight he boarded in New York.
The New York court reached this result by applying the Massachusetts wrong-
ful death act minus its limitation on recovery; the limitation was said to vio-
late New York's public policy. A District of Columbia court could achieve the
same result in the hypothetical case by adopting the public policy approach;
the limiting language of the District's statute would be irrelevant, since re-
covery would be "on" the foreign act, though minus its damage limit. Al-
though the desired result would be reached, this approach is logically weak.
To say a foreign wrongful death act applies, but without an important limiting
factor, is not really to "apply" the foreign act. The court in fact is applying
its own act to the foreign accident. 64 Since the public policy language in Kil-
62. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2701 (1973).
63. 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
64. New York abandoned the public policy theory in later cases and frankly admitted
that it was giving extraterritorial effect to its wrongful death act. In Farber v. Smolack,
20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967), New York applied both its
wrongful death act and its owner liability statute to a North Carolina accident involving
an automobile owned by a New Yorker who loaned it to his brother's family, also from
New York, for a trip to Florida and back. In a suit for the wrongful death of the
brother's wife, the court overruled its earlier decisions to the "extent that [they] declined
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berg cannot be taken seriously, the question still remains whether the limit-
ing language in the District's statute prevents the District from reaching the
same result as New York on a District version of the Kilberg facts.
Since New York's wrongful death act does not contain the same limiting
language as the District's, New York was not confronted with this prob-
lem in Kilberg. However the New York owner liability statute is limited
to the use and operation of vehicles "in this state." 65 That language, how-
ever, did not prevent New York from applying its act to a North Carolina
accident in Farber v. Smolack.6 6 The New York court said that "since the
present litigation is concerned with New York residents, [and] aris[es] from
New York relationships, the rule apportioning liability from these relation-
ships ought to be governed by New York law."
67
For the District to take this same approach-ignoring the territorially
limiting language of its statute-would require it to disavow language in
Gaither v. Myers,6 s which construed literally the similar language of the Dis-
trict's owner liability act. But the court might well be persuaded to do so
if a literal reading of the wrongful death act produced an absurd result. If,
for example, during a weekend auto trip to the seashore, a District driver
injured his District guest in Rehoboth, Delaware, application of interest
analysis would not lead the District to apply Delaware's guest statute. Would
it make sense, then, after using interest analysis to decide that Delaware had
no interest in the case, to apply Delaware's wrongful death act if the guest
died? It seems absurd to grant the District plaintiff the benefit of District
law in the case of injury but withhold it in the case of death, particularly
if the only basis for doing so is language unthinkingly placed in the District's
wrongful death act at a time when territorialism was in vogue. By far the
sounder approach would be to follow New York's lead in Farber and ignore
the limiting language.
Another question raised by Tramontana is whether it changes the tradi-
tional rule that any person injured in the District may recover the damages
provided by District law. In light of the District's lack of interest in applying
its law in behalf of a Marylander killed in Brazil, would it follow that when
to give extraterritorial effect to the [wrongful death] statute." id. at 204, 229 N.E.2d at
40, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 253. Cf. Long v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213
N.E.2d 796, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513 (1965) (New York applied Pennsylvania's wrongful death
act to cases arising from explosion over Maryland of airliner en route from Philadelphia
to Puerto Rico).
65. N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC LAW § 388 (McKinney 1970).
66. 20 N.Y.2d 198, 229 N.E.2d 36, 282 N.Y.S.2d 248 (1967); see note 64 supra.
67. Id. at 203, 229 N.E.2d at 39, 282 N.Y.S.2d at 252.
68. 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968), discussed at pp. 452-65 supra.
19751
Catholic University Law Review
a domiciliary of a jurisdiction which limits wrongful death damages is killed
in the District, his estate should be held to the lower limits the domicile im-
poses? It appears not, for the District can surely be counted upon to apply
its own law under a deterrence theory, as well as under the language of the
District's Act. There would be no District interest in protecting the defend-
ant, of course, because the District's more plaintiff-protecting law-unlike
Brazil's defendant-protecting law in Tramontana-would express none.
Moreover, the lower limit of the plaintiff's domicile would express no interest
in protecting the defendant unless the defendant also happened to reside in
that state. Finally, there would be no District interest in compensating the
foreign plaintiff since local medical creditors would probably not participate
in the proceeds. One is left with the District policy of deterrence, a policy
which the California Supreme Court recently found sufficient to invoke forum
law on similar facts. Survivors of a Mexican national were allowed to
recover full damages from a California defendant who wrongfully killed the
decedent in California. The California court held that California's higher
measure of damages expressed a deterrence policy, and that this policy was
advanced by applying California's measure instead of the lower limit of
Mexico. 69 A false conflict existed because the lower limit of the plaintiff's
domicile was not intended to "punish" the plaintiff; it merely intended to pro-
tect the defendant against too large a recovery. Since the defendant did not
reside in Mexico, the policy was not advanced by applying it to him. In
effect, this argument is similar to the one made earlier in the variation of
Gaither in which a Maryland resident is killed in the District by a District
car stolen in Maryland. 70 Generally speaking, the various analyses made in
Gaither would apply as well to wrongful death.
Before leaving this subject, it should be noted that both Maryland and
Virginia now have more liberal regimes on wrongful death than does the Dis-
trict.7 1 For example, if the recent air disaster near Dulles International Air-
69. Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1974); see note 25 supra.
70. See p. 455 supra.
71. Virginia repealed its damage limitation on July 1, 1974. The new provision, VA.
CODE ANN. § 8-636.1 (Supp. 1974), provides:
The jury in any such action may award such damages as to it may seem fair
and just, and may direct in what proportion they shall be distributed to the
surviving spouse, children, and grandchildren of the deceased, or if there be
none such, then to the parents, brothers and sisters of the deceased. As to
members of the same class, the jury shall have discretion as to who shall re-
ceive the whole or any part of the recovery.
The verdict of the jury shall include, but may not be limited to, damages
for the following: (a) sorrow, mental anguish, and solace which may include
society, companionship, comfort, guidance, kindly offices and advise of the de-
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port 72 had caused the death of a minor child domiciled in the District, his
survivors would be wise to sue in Virginia since District law does not pro-
vide recovery for mental anguish.73 Virginia would apply the lex loci rule
and award damages for mental anguish under its own law.74 If the flight
had proceeded on toward National Airport and had crashed on the Maryland
side of the Potomac River, the surviving District parent could recover for
mental anguish by suing in Maryland. 75 Thus, a District citizen on these
facts would be treated more favorably by either adjoining state than by his
own.
76
cedent; (b) compensation for reasonably expected loss of (i) income of the
decedent, and (ii) services, protection, care and assistance provided by the de-
cedent; (c) expenses for the care, treatment and hospitalization of the dece-
dent incident to the injury resulting in death; and (d) reasonable funeral ex-
penses.
Damages recoverable under (c) and (d) above shall be apportioned pro rata
among the creditors who rendered such services, as their respective interests
may appear ....
Maryland's wrongful death act, MD. CTs. & Juv. PRo. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1974),
provides:
Damages if spouse or minor child dies.-For the death of a spouse or minor
child, the damages awarded under subsection (c) are not limited or restricted
by the "pecuniary loss" or "pecuniary benefit" rule but may include damages
for mental anguish, emotional pain and suffering, loss of society, companion-
ship, comfort, protection, marital care, parental care, filial care, attention, ad-
vice, counsel, training, guidance, or education where applicable.
72. Ninety-two persons were killed on December 1, 1974 when a Trans World Air-
lines flight from Indianapolis crashed into a mountaintop on its landing approach to
Dulles International Airport after being redirected from National Airport. See Wash-
ington Post, Dec. 2, 1974, § A, at 1, col. 1.
73. See Runyon v. District of Columbia, 463 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Bunyea
v. Metropolitan R.R., 19 D.C. (8 Mackey) 76 (1890). In the District, damages
for the death of a child are calculated by considering the likely earnings of the child
until majority, the possible contributions of the child to the support of its parents after
majority, and the cost of rearing the child. See Hord v. National Homeopathic Hosp.,
102 F. Supp. 792 (D.D.C. 1952), aff'd, 204 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1953). Even without
recovery for mental anguish, however, damages can be substantial. See id. ($17,000
damages for death of a newborn infant). See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 127 (4th ed. 1971).
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636.1 (Supp. 1974), quoted at note 71 eupra, would apply
to cases where the injuries were received in Virginia. Cf. Dickenson v. Tabb, 208 Va.
184, 156 S.E.2d 795 (1967) (West Virginia law applied to collision in West Virginia
involving parties from Virginia and West Virginia). See also Taylor v. Taylor, 189 Va.
753, 53 S.E.2d 820 (1949); Sutton v. Bland, 166 Va. 132, 184 S.E. 231 (1936); Baise
v. Hollifield, 158 Va. 498, 164 S.E. 657 (1932).
75. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-904(d) (1974) (allowing recovery for
mental anguish from death of a child); id. § 3-903(a) (1974) (law of place of injury
applies to wrongful death).
76. He would also have a longer time to bring suit in the adjoining states. District
law imposes a one-year limit on actions for wrongful death, D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2702
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C. Immunity
On the subject of tort immunities, the District's choice of law rules suffer
from uncertainty in the municipal law. Recent developments have been in
three areas: interspousal immunity, intrafamily (parent-child) immunity,
and contribution among joint tortfeasors.
Roscoe v. Roscoe 7 is the leading case in interspousal immunity. A Dis-
trict wife sued her District husband in the District for injuries sustained in a
North Carolina automobile accident. North Carolina law permitted the
action; District law did not.78 The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit applied North Carolina law in a strange opinion
which contradicted 'District precedent, ran counter to interest analysis, and
ignored the weight of enlightened authority from other states. The court
said:
Measured in terms simply of "significant relationships" as bearing
(1973), whereas Virginia allows two years, VA. CODE ANN. § 8-634 (Supp. 1975), and
Maryland allows three. Mo. CTS. & JUD. PRO. CODE ANN. § 3-904(f) (1974).
There has also been a movement in the District toward applying interest analysis to
the statute of limitations. The first case was Farrier v. May Dep't Stores Co., 357 F.
Supp. 190 (D.D.C. 1973), in which the court refused to apply the District's longer lim-
itation period to a claim for personal injuries sustained in a Virginia department store.
The court said the District had no interest in giving relief to a Virginia resident injured
in Virginia after Virginia's shorter period had expired. The second case was Cornwell
v. C.I.T. Corp., 373 F. Supp. 661 (D.D.C. 1974), in which a Virginia citizen was in-
jured in Anchorage, Alaska while riding in an airplane belonging to a New York defend-
ant. The court again used interest analysis, refusing to apply the longer District period
in the absence of any District interest in the case. The court in Cornwell was faced,
however, with a holding in Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz, 452 F.2d 1346
(D.C. Cir. 1971), that limitations are "procedural" and hence goverened by forum law.
The Cornwell court ruled that the holding in Fox-Greenwald on limitations had been
superseded by the more recent case of Nyhus v. Travel Management Corp., 466 F.2d
440 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Nyhus had stated in a footnote that the limitations issue was only
governed by forum law because "[tihe record does not disclose where the . . . contract
was made or . . . performed." Id. at 443 n.11. Unfortunately, the whole question is
complicated still further by the language used by the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals-now the highest court in the District of Columbia, see note 1 supra-in the later
case of May Dep't Stores Co. v. Devercelli, 314 A.2d 767 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973).
There, the court applied the District period, saying "[tlhis issue being procedural is gov-
erned by the statute of limitations of the forum." Id. at 773. See also Fowler v. A
& A Co., 262 A.2d 344 (D.C. Ct. App. 1970) (using similar language). Neither Far-
rier nor Nyhus was cited in Devercelli, and Devercelli was not cited in Cornwell. If
a resourceful lawyer can persuade either the federal or local courts to read each other's
opinions, an eventual resolution may emerge.
77. 379 F.2d 94 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
78. Interspousal immunity in the District of Columbia was established in Thompson
v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910). The Roscoe court noted the criticism to which
Thompson had been subjected, 379 F.2d at 98, but avoided ruling whether it should con-
tinue to be followed. For a general discussion of the obsolescence of the immunity doc-
trine, see W. PROSSER, supra note 73, at § 122.
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upon the choice of law here to be applied, North Carolina would
seem to have no interest in this litigation beyond its entitlement to
our respectful deference to its law, as we conceive it to be. But
under the usual rule of comity we would normally accord recog-
nition to such rights as had there accrued .... 79
After noting that the immunity rule had been criticized and that the plain-
tiff's husband had died after the action was filed, the court continued:
We deem it sufficient to note that this appellant wife had
gained a right of action under the law of North Carolina; that right
followed her here; the husband died, and upon his death the basis
of the doctrine disappeared . . . . Balancing the respective in-
terests in such circumstances . . . we may apply the law of North
Carolina.80
A court using this language is obviously not following the method of
interest analysis used in Tramontana, Williams, and Gaither. On these facts
the wife has not "gained a right of action" unless one assumes that North
Carolina law applies to the case. Of course, to assume North Carolina law
applies one must assume the point in question-that of which jurisdiction's
law applies. No right exists if one assumes that District law applies. The
true problem is to decide why one law or the other should apply. But the
court's language is a classical statement of the circular reasoning of the ter-
ritorial theory, which assumed that rights "vest" at the place of the wrong
and "follow" the plaintiff to other jurisdictions. It ignores completely the
policies underlying the laws in conflict.
The method in interest analysis would be wholly different. The District's
immunity rule would be found to express only two possible policies: preser-
vation of family harmony and the protection of insurers from collusive suits.
Both policies have been cited in the District's decisions stating the local rule;8 '
both would have been advanced in Roscoe by applying the District's im-
munity law to the District spouses driving an auto insured in the District.
The contrary rule of North Carolina also expresses two policies: a welfare
interest in compensating the injured plaintiff, and the creation of a fund for
payments of persons rendering medical services to the plaintiff. 82  Because
79. 379 F.2d at 97.
80. Id. at 99.
81. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626, 627 (D.C. Cir. 1950) ("preserva-
tion of domestic peace and felicity is the policy upon which the rule of immunity be-
tween husband and wife is based"); Dennis v. Walker, 284 F. Supp. 413, 417 (D.D.C.
1968) ("insurance . . . may lead to fraud, or at least collusive, or at best friendly
suits.").
82. The Supreme Court, in Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), cited the medical creditor interest as a reason for allow-
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the plaintiff was from the District the compensatory interest of North
Carolina could not be advanced by applying North Carolina law in Roscoe.
The only possible reason for applying North Carolina law would be to reim-
burse medical creditors rendering aid -in North Carolina, the site of the injury.
Thus the District's interest in preserving the harmony of a District marriage
and the District's interest in preventing collusive suits against the District in-
surer would have to be balanced against North Carolina's interest in creating
a fund for its medical creditors. In similar conflicts, most recent cases have
applied the law of the spouses' domicile.8 3 Indeed, even before Roscoe, the
District precedent indicated that the reference in the District would be to Dis-
trict law under the Roscoe facts. In Baker v. Gaffney14 the court applied
the District's immunity law to bar the claim of a District wife against a person
who loaned his car to her District husband. Although the injury was in New
York, a state allowing interspousal suits, the court held the auto owner was
not vicariously liable to the wife because she had no claim against her hus-
band under District law. Was Baker, unmentioned in Roscoe, overruled by
that case?
The best approach to Roscoe is to view the choice of law language as un-
fortunate dicta in a case which really held the District's immunity rule inap-
plicable when a spouse has died, and which, therefore, involved no question
of family harmony. This interpretation reconciles Roscoe with the later Dis-
trict precedents,8 5 and recognizes the obvious fact that death nullifies the
policy behind the immunity rule. Otherwise it is impossible to reconcile
ing the state of injury to apply its own law to foreign plaintiffs injured within its bor-
ders.
83. See Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Schwartz v. Schwartz,
103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254 (1968); Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P.2d 218
(1955); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Baits v. Baits, 273
Minn. 419, 142 N.W.2d 66 (1966); Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781
(1966); Thompson v. Thompson, 105 N.H. 86, 193 A.2d 439 (1963); Koplik v. C.P.
Trucking Corp., 27 N.J. 1, 141 A.2d 34 (1958); Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.
2d 597 (1936); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Haumschild v.
Continental Cas. Co,, 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
84. 141 F. Supp. 602 (D.D.C. 1956). The Baker court applied forum (District) law
by characterizing the immunity issue as "procedural." It relied upon the New York case
of Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E.2d 597 (1936), which had utilized a similar
characterization to apply New York's immunity law to an action by a New York wife
against her New York husband for injuries sustained in Connecticut. New York repudi-
ated the procedural views of Mertz in Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 15 N.Y.2d
9, 203 N.E.2d 210, 254 N.Y.S.2d 527 (1964), in which the court stated that the real
basis for choosing New York law in Mertz was that "all the significant contacts of the
case were with New York." Id. at 16, 203 N.E.2d at 213, 254 N.Y.S.2d at 532. It
follows that Baker, too, should now be viewed as having referred to District law because
the domicile of the spouses made the District's interest predominant.
85. See Emmert v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1969).
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either the analysis or the result of Roscoe with the balance of District conflicts
law.
We return to more consistent theory with the latest case on intrafamily
(parent-child) immunity. Emmert v. United States88 was a suit against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained in a
District collision between the auto of a Tennessee family and a vehicle owned
by the federal government. When the minor daughter of the family sued the
government for negligence, the government sought contribution from the
father.
The court's first task was to ascertain District law. Until the 1968 decision
in Dennis v. Walker,8 7 the courts had never squarely decided whether parent-
child immunity existed in the District. In Dennis, relying on cases from
foreign jurisdictions, the court held parent-child immunity applicable to Dis-
trict residents. Unlike interspousal immunity, which followed from the
common law concept of the "oneness" of spouses, parent-child immunity
was developed in fairly recent judicial decisions based solely upon public
policy, although interspousal cases were used as a guide.88 Thus the exist-
ence of parent-child immunity depends far more upon judicial willingness to
preserve it than does the immunity of spouses. The court in Emmert noted
the trend of modern cases in favor of abolishing the doctrine and pointed
out that New York had overruled the case upon which the Dennis court re-
lied. 89 Since it was therefore doubtful whether immunity existed in the Dis-
trict, the court had to choose between District law and that of Tennessee,
where the doctrine was still in force.
To solve the problem through interest analysis, the relevant policies would
be the same for parent-child immunity as for interspousal immunity. The
domicile's interest in preserving family harmony and preventing collusive suits
is advanced by having its immunity law applied. This is to be weighed
against the place of injury's interest in protecting its medical creditors, an in-
terest advanced by applying its law imposing liability. When, as in Emmert,
the place of injury is the forum, the court could properly find the domicile's
interest stronger and defer to domicile law.90 This was the result in Emmert,
86. Id.
87. 284 F. Supp. 413 (D.D.C. 1968).
88. See W. PROssER, supra note 73, at 865. Prosser traces the first parent-child
immunity case to Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), an action for false
imprisonment.
89. See Gelbman v. Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 245 N.E.2d 192, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529
(1969), overruling Badigian v. Badigian, 9 N.Y.2d 472, 174 N.E.2d 718, 215 N.Y.S.2d
35 (1961).
90. This occurred in Johnson v. Johnson, 107 N.H. 30, 216 A.2d 781 (1966), a case
in which a New Hampshire court used interest analysis to apply Massachusetts law
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although the court's opinion did little more than list the "contacts," cite the
latest Restatement (which refers intrafamily immunity to the domicile), 91
and then declare that domicile law applied. Since the court mentioned that
its approach was "issue oriented," and spoke of the "respective relationships
of the competing jurisdictions," the result must be taken to mean that it found
the domicile's interest heavier.
Thus far, the District's immunity cases have been confined to those in
which the family members and spouses have been domiciliaries of the state
granting immunity. Roscoe considered the application of the District's im-
munity law to District spouses; Emmert considered the application of
Tennessee's immunity law to a Tennessee family. What of the case involving
spouses domiciled in a liability state who are injured in an immunity state,
such as the District? In such a case the policies expressed by the immunity
law-preserving family harmony and preventing collusive suits-could not be
advanced by being applied to families not domiciled in the state having the
policy. The District presumably has no greater interest in preserving the
harmony of a North Carolina family than North Carolina, which has decided
that liability should exist. Since the liability state's policy of compensating
the injured plaintiff is clear, that state's law should be applied under a false
conflict rationale. Normally, of course, this case would not arise because the
action would be filed in the liability state.
D. Contribution
The Emmert case also poses the issue of contribution. The government
sought to compel the father-whose negligence allegedly contributed to
causing the harm-to provide the contribution admittedly due under District
law from a joint tortfeasor.9 2 The court, by applying the District rule on
contribution in immunity cases, under which contribution is not allowed when
the party from whom contribution is sought has a complete defense against
the original party plaintiff, refused to give contribution. 3
It is not at all clear why District law should be applied to these facts. Con-
tribution is denied under District law in immunity cases because the immune
spouse would otherwise be forced to take a position hostile to the spouse who
is the original plaintiff-a subversion of the policy of family harmony upon
which the immunity doctrine is based.9 4 It would advance this "no contribu-
to the claim of a Massachusetts wife against her husband for injuries sustained in New
Hampshire.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 169 (1969).
92. See Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
93. See id.
94. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 169 (1969).
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tion" policy to apply it to cases such as Roscoe and Baker, in which the Dis-
trict has a policy of interspousal immunity and the spouses are from the Dis-
trict. In Emmert, however, the District did not have a policy of parent-child
immunity. Moreover, the family was from Tennessee. If one assumes-as the
court did in Emmert-that immunity no longer exists in the District, that
means that it is now the District's policy to impose liability on parents for
harm to their children. The District would have decided to sacrifice what-
ever benefit in family harmony there may have been from immunity in favor
of the presumably greater benefits to be derived from the minor child's re-
covery. The father would therefore be liable under District law for contribu-
tion because he would share the other joint tortfeasor's liability to the child.
There would be no reason to deny contribution because there would-by
hypothesis-no longer be the policy of family harmony upon which a denial
of contribution could be based. It would seem that if the District has a policy
of liability and contribution, it now conflicts with Tennessee's policy of im-
munity. The District's policy of contribution would be designed to prevent
the unjust enrichment of one joint tortfeasor through a shift of the whole ex-
pense to the other, and that policy would be advanced when the party seek-
ing contribution was based in the District and acted there. Tennessee's
policy would still be to deny contribution in order to protect its resident fam-
ily. In such a case the District could recognize the immunity insofar as it
affected merely the rights of the family members among themselves-as it
did in Emmert-but decline to recognize it to the extent of depriving the local
joint tortfeasor of his remedy in restitution. This has been the approach of
the Restatement (Second)95 and of courts using interest analysis. 9 It seems
more sensible because, under the rule set down in Emmert, the local de-
fendant (here the federal government) would bear the entire cost when the
family is from Tennessee but only half when the family is from the District.
Why should District defendants be made to pay more when the family is from
some other state? And why should District families recover less than others
from a local defendant?
7
It is also possible that a contribution issue might arise in a case in which
spouses from a liability state were injured in the District. It would seem
absurd for the District-by applying its immunity law-to protect the marital
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., La Chance v. Service Trucking Co., 215 F. Supp. 162 (D. Md. 1963);
Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466 (1968); Health
v. Zellmer, 35 Wis. 2d 578, 151 N.W.2d 664 (1967).
97. The same reasoning would be applied by the courts of a liability state in which
District spouses might be injured. That state could be expected to allow contribution
at the request of a local defendant acting at home.
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harmony of these spouses more than would their domicile. And there is no
reason for the District to give the defendant seeking contribution fewer rights
than would the domicile of the marriage whose supposed protection is the
reason for denying contribution. In such a case a false conflict would exist
and the District should apply the law of the liability state.
II. CONTRACTS
The District's choice of law approach for contracts is mainly set out in one
case, and that case is wholly dominated by the approach of the Restatement
(Second). In re Parkwood, Inc.98 presented the question whether District
or Maryland law applied to three mortgage loan transactions secured by
Maryland land. In the first, a lender incorporated in the District and having
its sole office there loaned $375,000 at 61/4% to a Maryland borrower.
The loan was negotiated in the District, the note and deed of trust were exe-
cuted in the District, and repayment was to be made in the District. The
court held that the District's loan shark law99 applied to these facts. In the
second transaction, the lender also had its principal office in the District, re-
payment also was to be made in the District, but the negotiations with the
Maryland borrower took place in both the District and Maryland, and the
note and deed of trust were executed in Maryland. The court applied Dis-
trict law to these facts also, voiding the loan of $100,000 at 6%%. In
the third transaction, a Canadian lender with its headquarters in Toronto had
been placed in touch with a Maryland borrower through a mortgage broker
having its sole office in the District. The loan was negotiated and executed
outside the District and repayment was made in Toronto. The court sus-
tained this loan of $545,000 at 614% by applying Maryland law.
To evaluate these transactions for choice of law purposes, and to distin-
guish the first two from the third, the court decided to plunge rather deeply
into the Restatement (Second). Section 188, upon which the court relied, 100
provides as follows:
98. 461 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
99. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 26-601 to -611 (1967). This law voided loans made at more
than six percent interest if made by lenders subject to its provisions who had not obtained
a license. After the instant loans were made-but before the case was decided-the Act
was amended to exclude the lenders in Parkwood from its provisions. D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 26-610 (1973). The loan shark law has since been further amended by the District
of Columbia Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1971. See id. § 26-612 (1973).
100. The court did not apply the Restatement's usury section, RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 203 (1971), because the loan shark law is drafted as
a licensing statute. 461 F.2d at 194 n.78. Section 203 reads as follows:
The validity of a contract will be sustained against the charge of usury if it
provides for a rate of interest that is permissible in a state to which the con-
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(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue
in contract are determined by the local law of the state which, with
respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
(2) . . . the contacts to be taken into account in applying the
principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue in-
clude:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpora-
tion and place of business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative im-
portance with respect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of per-
formance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usu-
ally be applied ...
This, of course, is a rather loose guide. The several "contacts" are all
to be "taken into account," but their "importance" depends upon the "par-
ticular issue." This can be read to sound like governmental interest anal-
ysis: one would first identify the policies ("issues") underlying the laws in
conflict and then determine, in view of the facts at bar (the "contacts"),
which policy would be advanced by applying it to the case. However, the
Restatement (Second) does not speak in terms of policies being advanced; it
speaks only of "contacts" being "evaluated." One can agree, of course, that a
given contact (fact) will vary in importance according to the choice of law
issue, but the problem of what to do after this truth has been acknowledged
still remains. To say simply that a "contact" is to be "evaluated" doesn't take
one very far. It was, no doubt, for this reason that the final draft of the
Restatement (Second) provided a separate set of "factors" in section 6-incor-
porated by reference into section 188-which are relevant to the choice of
the applicable rule of law:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
tract has a substantial relationship and is not greatly in excess of the rate per-
mitted by the general usury law of the state of the otherwise applicable law
under the rule of § 188.
Application of this section would probably have sustained all the Parkwood transactions
because Maryland, under whose law the transactions would have been valid, was the
state of the borrower's domicile and the situs of the encumbered land. According to
comment (c) to section 203, these contacts are sufficient to form a "substantial relation-
ship" to the contract.
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(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be
applied.
It would be possible, again, to read this language as requiring interest anal-
ysis; one would emphasize factors (b) and (c) of section 6 and the "partic-
ular issue" language of section 188. By emphasizing other factors, of course,
the section could be read so as not to require interest analysis. Finally, by
emphasizing the contacts of section 188, and deemphasizing the principles of
section 6, one could revert to a numerical sort of counting: a totaling of the
contacts pointing in one direction or the other with little concern for policy.
In Parkwood, the majority opinion followed the latter course while the dis-
sent struggled with the factors of section 6.
The first and third transactions in Parkwood presented no controversy un-
der the Restatement. In the first, the negotiation, execution, and repayment
were in the District; so was the lender. The court said that the domicile of
the Maryland borrower and the situs of the Maryland land were insufficient
to displace District law.1 1 In the third, neither the borrower nor the lender
was from the District, and the negotiation, execution, and repayment of the
loan was outside the District. The only District contact was the domicile of
the mortgage broker, which the majority and the dissent agreed was not
enough to displace Maryland law.
It was on the second transaction that the majority and the dissent could
not agree. With the lender from the District, the borrower from Maryland,
the loan negotiated in both the District and Maryland, repayment in the Dis-
trict, and execution in Maryland, things were not clear. Each side took a
different view of how the facts should be used in the "contacts" approach.
The majority, going down the list in section 188, agreed that contact (1)
(place of contracting) was in Maryland, but said that contacts (2) (place
of negotiation) and (3) (place of petformance) were in the District, and that
contacts (4) (location of the subject matter) and (5) (domicile of the par-
ties) were divided between the District and Maryland.' 0 2 Contact 4 was di-
vided, the majority said, because the loan proceeds were advanced from the
District and the mortgaged realty was in Maryland. The result was that Dis-
trict law applied. The dissent, going down the same list, said contacts (1)
101. 461 F.2d at 199.
102. Id. at 195-96.
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(place of contracting), (3) (place of performance), and (4) (location of
the subject matter) were in Maryland, and that contacts (2) (place of nego-
tiation) and (5) (domicile of parties) were divided.' 03 The dissent man-
aged to disagree about the place of performance because it thought the per-
formance was the receipt of the loan proceeds in Maryland (not the advanc-
ing or repaying of it ,in the District), and it managed to disagree about the
location of the subject matter because it felt the only subject matter was the
realty, which was in Maryland. To complicate the differences further, the
dissent also relied upon the "factors" of section 6, saying that while factor
(b) (the relevant policies of the forum) called for the application of District
law, factor (c) (the relevant policies of other interested states) called for
Maryland law, as did factors (d), (e), (f), and (g). The majority could
only respond that loan activity in the District was conduct "which the District
of Columbia does have a definite interest in regulating."' 104
If this case is the leading example of choice of law for contracts, what then
is the "law" in the District? Are we left with the "rule" that factors (a)
through (g) of section 6 of the Restatement (Second) will be applied by tak-
ing into account contacts (a) through (e) of section 188? This does not in-
spire much confidence. The sort of variable juggling found in the two Park-
wood opinions contributes little to the security of transactions. How does
one predict what the next appellate panel will think is the proper mix of these
ingredients? Though its uncertainty is bad enough, there is, however, an even
more serious objection to the method of Parkwood. The court in that case
did not really explore the purpose to be achieved by the law which it con-
strued. Just which persons and transactions were meant to be protected by
the District of Columbia's loan shark law?
It would seem that District citizens were intended to be the primary bene-
ficiaries of this law.' 05 The Act operates as a consumer protection de-
vice by shielding borrowers from exploitation. Does it advance this pro-
tective purpose to void loans made to Maryland borrowers on the security
of Maryland land at rates which are legal in Maryland? If Maryland has
not thought it necessary to protect its citizens from this type of loan, why
should the District protect them?
In Parkwood the court thought the answer depended upon where the loan
was negotiated, executed, and repaid. If, as in the second transaction, these
103. Id. at 202-03 (Van Pelt, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 199.
105. The Parkwood court was unable to find in the legislative history of the loan
shark law any indication of its territorial scope. The court did acknowledge, however,
that the purpose of the law was "the protection of the residents of Washington from
excessive interest .... ." Id. at 173.
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contacts are evenly distributed, one decides that a certain combination of
them on one side or the other tips the scale. This cannot work, of course,
because it cannot resolve the case in which the "contacts" have been manipu-
lated by the lender to take place outside the District, and it does not explain
why one combination or another of contacts is important.
In Horning v. District of Columbia,106 a pawnbroker lending money from
an office in the District took his District of Columbia clients across a bridge
into Virginia so the documents could be executed there. The Court had
no difficulty applying District law. The question, then, is whether the re-
sult should change if the pawnbroker moves his office across the bridge.
Does the District interest evaporate because the District borrower is forced
to ride the bus for an extra stop? The problem is to define the scope of the
District interest in the application of its own law. If District citizens have
easy access to prohibited loans, the District's protective policy is wholly
frustrated by enforcing these loans in the District's courts. 10 7  It is unchari-
table to 'think the drafters of the loan shark law intended such an easy nullifica-
tion of its terms.' 08 From this hypothetical case it is clear that one cannot
measure the scope of the District's policy simply by looking at "contacts."
To make sense out of District law one must apply it in the hypothetical case
where the loan is negotiated, executed, and repaid outside the District's bor-
ders and where the lender is not a District lender.
How does Parkwood look in light of this view of the District interest? The
sole reason for voiding a loan on Maryland land to a Maryland borrower
would be to advance some policy of deterrence. No protective interest of
106. 254 U.S. 135 (1920).
107. For a treatment of this exact problem, see Baxter, Choice of Law and the Fed-
eral System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 12-15 (1963). Baxter analyzes the situation as fol-
lows:
A choice rule based on the lender's knowledge of the borrower's residence
and of other characteristics of membership in the protected class affords maxi-
mum implementation of the policies of both states. Consensual expectations
of the lender would be protected except when he had reason to know the trans-
action was forbidden by [the borrower's domicile]. And the objectives of ...
the borrower's state . . . would be shielded from wholesale evasion: the nature
of the transaction assures that prior to extending credit the lender will discover
in most cases the borrower's residence ....
Id. at 15. For another example of the false conflict approach in contracts, see Lester
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 433 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1970), discussed in Prebble, Choice of
Law to Determine the Validity and Effect of Contracts: A Comparison of English and
American Approaches to the Conflict of Laws, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 433 (1973).
108. Cf. Lanham v. Lanham, 136 Wis. 360, 117 N.W. 787, 789 (1908), in which the
court stated, "To say that the Legislature intended such a law to apply only while the
parties are within the boundaries of the state, and that it contemplated that by crossing
the state line its citizens could successfully nullify its terms, is to make the act essentially
useless and impotent, and ascribe practical imbecility to the lawmaking power."
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Maryland would be involved because Maryland considers the loan to be
valid. So the question comes down to the importance of deterring District
lenders from making prohibited loans. I would suggest that in cases in which
it is not clear that the loan is covered by District law, the lender's expectation
should be protected. Little deterrence is lost in such a marginal case. In
the second transaction, for example, in which the loan on Maryland land to a
Maryland borrower was executed in Maryland, the lender could reasonably
suppose that the Restatement (Second)'s formula of factors and contacts (if
that is District "law") would point to the law of Maryland. The borrower,
after all, was not in the class which normally forms the object of District
concerns.
In the first transaction, in which everything was in the District except the
land and the borrower, the lender, of course, has a weaker case, though the
borrower is still not in the protected class. By placing these two transactions
on a scale of interest in deterrence, one could rationally decide to mark a
boundary at the point at which this interest becomes too weak for further
protection. This is not possible, of course, with the "contacts" approach. 10 9 It
would seem that in order to maintain some minimum rationality from one
decision to the next, the court must attempt to define just what the District's
interest is. Only then can one predict to which possible combinations of facts
it might be thought to apply.
Although Parkwood does contain the most complete discussion of local
choice of law for contracts, there are other recent cases which also should
be noted. In Legg, Mason & Co. v. Mackall & Co, Inc.,"10 the law of New
York was applied to determine whether a dispute between two District busi-
nesses was subject to arbitration under the constitution and rules of the New
York Stock Exchange. The court found that New York "has many, if not
the most significant contacts with parties who are members . . . of . . .the
New York Stock Exchange,""' and -that the constitution and rules of the Ex-
change-requiring arbitration-formed a binding contract between its mem-
109. Congress seems to have agreed with the "interest" approach and to have dis-
agreed with the Parkwood result; shortly after the Parkwood decision the District law
was amended to exclude cases in which the borrower is not a District resident and in
which the land lies outside the District's boundaries. District of Columbia Consumer
Credit Protection Act of 1971, D.C. CODE ANN. § 26-612 (1973). See also Montgom-
ery Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Baer, 308 A.2d 768 (D.C. Ct. App. 1973) (when secured
land and loan settlement were both in the District the parties agreed that District law
governed loan by Maryland lender to District borrower); D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3303
(1973) (applies the District's usury law "[i]f a person or corporation contracts in the
District .... ")
110. 351 F. Supp. 1367 (D.D.C. 1972).
,11. Id. at 1369.
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bers under New York law. Fox-Greenwald Sheet Metal Co. v. Markowitz
Bros., Inc."1 2 involved the interpretation of a nonassignment provision in a
construction contract. A Maryland subcontractor, Fox-Greenwald, had
promised its prime contractor not to assign its rights under their agreement.
Fox-Greenwald did so nonetheless, and the court held the assignment valid
as between the assignor and the assignee. Maryland had the "more essential
contacts" because Maryland was the place of performance and the record did
not show where either the contract or the assignment was made.118  Finally,
in McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc.,"14 a Maryland resident claimed the
benefit of District law in a warranty suit against the seller and manufacturer
of an auto destroyed in Maryland by a fire allegedly due to defects in the
carburetor. The court applied District law because the auto was purchased
in the District."15
It is doubtful whether, from the cases decided thus far, rules of much cer-
tainty can be stated in contract cases. The most one can do is describe a
method taking shape. Since the method is "issue oriented," one can predict
(or hope) that it will develop in a way which makes it possible to determine
the multistate scope of District law on some rationally consistent basis. I
would suggest that the most fruitful line of development would be to follow
the "pure" interest analysis model of Gaither, rather than the looser "con-
tacts" approach of Parkwood. After the decision in Gaither, we know that
the District's key regulation contains a deterrence policy, that this policy ex-
tends to conduct within the District, and that the domicile of the injured
plaintiff is not controlling. After Williams, we know this deterrence policy
also applies to injuries occurring beyond the District suburbs. And after Tra-
montana, we know that the compensatory aspect of the regulation would not
extend to injuries received by District citizens outside the suburbs by a theft
occurring beyond the suburbs. After the "contacts" decisions in Parkwood,
Legg, Mason, and Fox-Greenwald, what do we know? Can we really predict
what the result will be in the next contract case in which the "contacts" are
divided?
To see how the "pure" interest analysis of Gaither might apply in contracts,
let us consider a common problem in consumer protection. Congress in 1971
112. 452 F.2d 1346 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
113. id. at 1353-55. The court again placed heavy reliance upon the Restatement
(Second). It cited section 208 for the proposition that the effect of an assignment is de-
termined by the state which has the most significant relationship to the original contract,
rather than to the assignment itself. It then looked to section 196 to conclude that be-
cause the contract was for services rendered in Maryland, Maryland was the state with
the most significant relationship to the contract.
114. 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
115. Id. at 921.
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gave the District one of the most advanced consumer protection regimes in
the United States. 116 The Commonwealth of Virginia, in which change has
been slower, 117 is a common place for District residents to shop. Suppose
a District resident buys a washer-dryer combination from a suburban Virginia
store on credit, signing the usual conditional sales contract and promissory
note. After delivery of the appliances in the District, what rights does the
consumer have if the appliances prove defective, or if he defaults on a pay-
ment? Under the law of Virginia the bank or finance company holding the
note could avoid the consumer's defenses against the seller by meeting the
requirements of a holder in due course."18 Holder in due course doc-
trine has been banished from consumer sales in the District."" Upon a de-
fault in payment the seller under Virginia law can accelerate the balance due
and repossess after ten days have passed.' 20  Under District law the seller
must wait thirty days.12' In Virginia -the consumer's right to redeem the col-
lateral is measured only by the state's adoption of the Uniform Commercial
Code;' 22 in the District the consumer has a minimum of fifteen days after the
creditor repossesses in which to redeem.'1 2  Should the District apply its own
law 'to all of these issues?
The protective policies of the District seem clearly advanced by doing so.
As the court noted in Gaither v. Myers, the District's choice of law rules
should not "shun the present reality of the economically and socially inte-
grated greater metropolitan area.'' 1 4  Surely the protection of District con-
sumers should not be made to depend upon whether a particular item was in
the stock of the District or suburban branch of a local department store, or
whether at the time the item was needed a suburban store was having a sale.
If only District merchants were covered, the effect would be to put these
merchants at a disadvantage by making it less expensive for their suburban
116. District of Columbia Consumer Protection Act of 1971, D.C. CODE ANN. §§
28-3801 to -3816 (1973).
117. Virginia has, however, made some significant strides in the consumer protection
field. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-362.1 (Supp. 1974) (abolishing the time-price
doctrine); id. § 11-4.2 (limiting seller's right to enforce balloon payments); id. §
11-4.3 (granting consumer ten-day grace period after default during which seller may
neither repossess goods nor accelerate payments).
118. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.3-302 to 305 (1965).
119. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 28-3807 to -3808 (1973). These sections have been
modeled after the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE §§ 3.307, 404. The drafters' com-
ment to § 3.307 flatly states that the "holder in due course doctrine should be abrogated
in consumer cases."
120. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-4.3 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
121. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3812(b)(1) (1973).
122. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-506 (1965).
123. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3812(c) (1) (A) (1973).
124. 404 F.2d 216, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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competitors to operate. It would seem that the District should follow the
approach of Horning v. District of Columbia125 and apply District law to
to any creditor who uses the District's courts against District citizens in
consumer credit transactions. This is the position of the 1969 and 1974 Uni-
form Consumer Credit Code 126 and the weight of authority in other states. 12 T
Any reliance arguments by the creditor, of course, are defeated by his ob-
vious knowledge of the buyer's residence.
A different problem is posed by the converse of these facts. What of the
Virginian who buys his appliances in the District, signing similar documents?
Can he rely upon District law as a defense to an action brought in Virginia?
Can he bring an action in the District for damages if the seller violates Dis-
trict law? The answer to the first question will depend upon Virginia's choice
of law rules. For small loans at least, the Virginia policy is clear: no loan
may be collected in Virginia which carries interest at a rate higher than that
125. 254 U.S. 135 (1920).
126. The UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 1.201(4) limits the right of creditors
to proceed against forum residents in the forum courts even on contracts made outside
the forum. The creditor in such cases may not assert the rights of a holder in due
course, and may not accelerate the balance due or repossess within the grace period.
Under section 1.201(3), the creditor is denied the use of the forum's courts to pursue
any of the creditor's remedies prohibited by the Code. In addition, the Code voids any
choice of law or choice of forum provision referring to another state when a forum resi-
dent is the buyer. Id. § 1.201(8). Unfortunately, these choice of law sections do not
seem to have been enacted in the District; perhaps it was thought unnecessary in view
of the District's enlighted approach to choice of law. See generally H. HART & A.
SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW
(tent. ed. 1958).
The particular issues posed here have been somewhat confused by the choice of law
sections of the U.C.C. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28:9-102(l)(a) (1973) provides that "this ar-
ticle applies so far as concerns any personal property . . . within the jurisdiction of the
District . . . to any transaction . .. which is intended to create a security interest in
personal property. . . ." To say that "this article applies," of course, is not to say very
much when article 9 is not the source of the rights in question. Moreover, the 1972
amendments to the U.C.C. proposed a modification of section 9-102 by deleting the
words "so far as concerns any personal property. . . within the jurisdiction of this state
. " The purpose of this change is to make it clear that, except for questions of
perfection of security interests, "problems of choice of law in this Article as to the valid-
ity of security agreements are governed by Section 1-105." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-102, Comment 3. This more general provision, section 1-105, (D.C. CODE
ANN. § 28:1-105 (1973)) provides that choice of law thereunder is "left to judicial deci-
sion" whenever the "transaction has significant contacts .. . with other jurisdictions."
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105, Comment 3. A conflict of laws case applying
this more general section to a secured transaction is Skinner v. Tober Foreign Motors,
Inc., 345 Mass. 429, 187 N.E.2d 669 (1963). But cf. Associates Discount Corp. v.
Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S.2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
127. The cases are collected in F. SCOLES & R. WEINTRAUB, CONFLICT OF LAWS 606-
07 (1972).
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allowed by the state where made.128 This statute shows a clear public policy
of giving Virginia consumers the benefit of the more protective laws of other
states in which they contract. In addition, Virginia still adheres to the -tradi-
tional practice of referring contract questions to the place of making.129 The
prediction therefore is that a Virginia court would apply District law on the
hypothetical facts: it would find that the relation of holder in due course
never came into being (not having been created by the law governing the
contract), and that the seller's rights in general would derive from, and be
limited by, the more protective District law.
The other question is whether the District should apply its own law on be-
half of this Virginia consumer if he comes to its courts for relief. This could
occur if the District seller refused, for example, to allow the consumer the
fifteen days required by District law in which to redeem the goods after re-
possession.'8 0 If the secured party disposes of the collateral, as would have
been his right under the Uniform Commercial Code,' s ' the consumer will suf-
fer a loss for which District law gives him a remedy, one sufficient to "put
[him] in at least as good a position as if the creditor had fully com-
plied. .... ,,132 By giving him this remedy under its own law, the District would
not frustrate any strong policy of Virginia; the more defendant-protecting
policy of Virginia could not be advanced by shielding District defendants
making contracts in the District. Virginia, moreover, would probably apply
District law if the case were brought in Virginia, as stated above. Would
the District, then, advance its own policies by applying them on behalf of
someone from outside the District? It would do so if there is a deterrence
value in preventing District sellers from making the prohibited agreements
at all. It would also do so under the policy announced in Gaither of uniform
treatment for all residents of the greater metropolitan area. This seems to
be the approach taken by the court in McCrossin v. Hicks Chevrolet, Inc.,1
88
in which the Maryland resident, who sustained a loss in Maryland on an
auto purchased in the District, was given the benefit of the District's more
protective law:
The rule in the District, dispensing with the requirements of
privity in implied warranty cases, is for the benefit and protection
of all who buy in the District, not for residents of the District alone;
128. See VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-291 (Supp. 1974).
129. See, e.g., Woodson v. Celina Mut. Ins. Co., 211 Va. 423, 177 S.E.2d 610
(1970); C.I.T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195 S.E. 659 (1938); Arkla Lumber & Mfg.
Co. v. West Virginia Timber Co., 146 Va. 641, 132 S.E. 840 (1926).
130. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3812(c) (1973).
131. id. § 28:9-505, 506; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-505, 506 (1965)..
132. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-3813(a) (1973).
133. 248 A.2d 917 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969).
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and affording that protection to a Maryland resident who buys here
would surely not violate any Maryland policy.'8
4
It should be noted that this result-application of District law to suburban
consumers making contracts in the District-is wholly consistent under in-
terest analysis with the application of District law to District consumers mak-
ing contracts in the suburbs. The first is a false conflict with only the Dis-
trict policy being advanced, and the second is a true conflict with the District
policy being preferred to that of the suburban jurisdiction. In both instances
the District is advancing its own policy by applying its own law to cases which
that law should logically cover. If the court were to follow a "contacts" ap-
proach instead, it would be difficult to arrive at this result by any means other
than manipulation. Since the various places of making, negotiating, and per-
forming these contracts have no significance apart from the relevant state in-
terests, the process of "grouping" them is merely confusing. ,In sum, the in-
terest analysis method of Gaither should be applied as well to contracts cases
and should replace the more confusing and less logical method of the Park-
wood case.
III. CONCLUSION
Wherever traditional theory has been abandoned, there has been a pe-
riod of confusion. For a time at least, it is difficult to state what the law
presently is or soon will be. Though -this is no doubt necessary, one should
nevertheless hope for an early agreement on basic principle, so that further
development can be cumulative and rational.
,In the District this could be achieved by recognizing that the new method
of decision is essentially an elaboration of the policies behind District law.
That is, choice of law decisions should now be viewed as the successive build-
ing up of an ever more complete definition of the territorial scope of District
policy. In this way, for example, one can see in the Gaither, Williams, and
Tramontana cases a coherent statement that the policies behind District tort
law require that it apply to certain factual situations but not to others. The
policies of compensation and deterrence begin to receive a boundary. This
could happen, of course, only because the court in those cases was willing
to identify the policies explicitly and apply them in a consistent way to the
134. Id. at 921, citing Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216 (D.C. Cir. 1968). This result
also could have been reached by applying District law on a "residual" basis. Since no
Maryland policy could be advanced by applying Maryland law, and no very strong Dis-
trict policy favors applying District law, the law of the place of contracting could be
given its presumptive sway simply because there would be no reason to displace it. Ap-
parently this is the position of the U.C.C.C. See UNwoa CONSUMER CRmIrr CODE
§ 1.201(1).
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factual patterns which arose. The court thus provided a body of reasoning
definite enough to be criticized, refined, and developed. Without this con-
sistency the court cannot avoid lapses such as Roscoe, or the seemingly ad
hoc manipulations of Parkwood. If, therefore, the District's courts will
simply remember that they are elaborating policy and that each case presents
an opportunity to build upon its predecessor, there is a good chance that as
the body of local predecent builds, so will reliability in the method of decision.
